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This article introduces the notion of shared intentional engagement and argues that the
current debate around intersubjective interaction can profit from taking that notion into
account. Shared intentional engagement holds between people when they relate together
to the same meaningful entities. For instance, when people talk about something,
they share intentional engagement as long as they don’t talk past each other. But
what if the entity talked about involves perceptual experience—is the quality of one’s
experiences not something that cannot be conveyed to others through language? Against
this widespread idea, this article takes up philosophical arguments for the intersubjectivity
of, on the one hand, language, and, on the other hand, phenomenal experience. It
contents that language and phenomenal experience both exhibit shared structures that
enable shared intentional engagement. It then considers an example for how this
result matches well with empirical research on “pop out” experiences. Because shared
intentional engagement is fundamental for all kinds of human interaction, it necessitates
interdisciplinary investigations that are frequently hindered by the assumption that the
phenomenal experiences of humans are hidden to others.
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Intersubjective interaction is becoming an increasingly important
topic in the literature on cognitive science, for good reason.
Intersubjective interaction is a pervasive feature of human life,
and thinking about it is apt to show and potentially over-
come the limits of the standard inferential approach to other
minds. This article looks into several recent attempts to do
so, and contents that the notion of shared intentional engage-
ment can contribute to a better understanding of intersub-
jective interaction. It considers the role of language and phe-
nomenal experience for intersubjective interaction, and argues
that both provide the structures that enable shared intentional
engagement.
An example for the inferential approach to other minds is
“theory theory,” according to which the participating subjects
apply their own and possibly implicit theories about the “men-
tal states” of others by means of a folk psychology, which is then
either falsified or confirmed in the interaction. Another example
is “simulation theory,” according to which one does not need a
theory of the “mental states” of others, but rather employs one’s
“own mind as a model, with which we simulate—create ‘as if ’
or pretend beliefs, desires, intentional states—and then project
these mental states into the mind of the other person to explain
or predict their behavior” (Gallagher, 2009, p. 290). Theory the-
ory assumes that knowledge about the mental states of others is
reached through a theory of their behavior. Simulation theory
contents that this is done by relating them to one’s own states
of mind, maybe through physiological mechanisms like those
manifested in “mirror neurons.”
The inferential approach attempts to explain intersubjective
interaction through an observation based model. Observation
surely is important for intersubjective interaction. Yet, it is a
one-way relation: the observer is observing the actor, but the
actor may not even know of the observation. Intersubjective
interaction, in contrast, is never just a one-way relation. There
are a number of recent attempts to understand what character-
izes intersubjective interaction, such as the distinction between
engagement and coupling by De Jaegher et al. (2010). “Coupling”
refers to exchanges that could be had between lifeless bodies, such
as the exchange of heat. Engagement, in contrast, is the “qual-
itative aspect of social interaction as it starts to ‘take over’ and
acquires a momentum of its own” (p. 441). Other authors, such
as Schilbach et al., point out that social cognition does not hap-
pen between detached observers, and contend that there often is
“emotional engagement” (Schilbach et al., 2013, p. 396).
While the details of the proposals of these authors are quite
different, they all make an important observation: coupling is
not enough for intersubjective interaction, there also has to be
engagement. The notion of engagement connects to that of the
second-person approach, according to which “recognizing and
being recognized by a You is primary for understanding other
people” (Reddy, 2008, p. 233). Part of what engagement means
is that the actors recognize each other. Engaged interaction is
a second-person relation in that the other is recognized as an
interactor. That means that she or he is recognized as somebody
who does not only act, but also reacts to the other’s actions,
who asks and responds, who has expectations, and who enters
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into obligations through her or his actions. Each action allows
some and forbids other future actions, which is a reason for why
engagement has a “momentum of its own.” Because such interac-
tions are likely to involve emotion, emotional engagement is an
important form of engagement.
In this article, I would like to draw attention to another form
of engagement that is of fundamental importance for all human
interaction. It may be dubbed shared intentional engagement.
Shared intentional engagement is the engagement people are in
when they relate together to an action, belief, idea, symbol, object,
or other meaningful entity. For instance, when two people talk
about an entity, they share intentional engagement. Of course,
people also talk past each other. When that happens, they cease
to engage in shared intentionality with regard to the meaning
of their speech. That does not mean that in shared intentional
engagement each subject has exactly the same understanding of
the entities intended. Nor is the meaning of the intended enti-
ties up to the individuals; each actor can learn new things about
the entity. Also, shared intentional engagement does not need to
be part of a full-blown language; it can be mediated through a
language or not. It can consist in pre-linguistic and simple lin-
guistic activities, such as when children and their parents relate to
an object in “joint attention” (cf. Tomasello, 1999)—which does
not have to mean that either interactor needs to have a represen-
tation of that object in her or his mind (cf. Reddy, 2008, p. 86). In
this article, “language” is used in a wide sense. It is not restricted
to representations, and it is thought to be intertwined with pre-
linguistic behavior, which the interactors may or may not be able
to verbalize.
Language and phenomenal experience are often thought to be
the two constituents of a dichotomy: On the one side, language
is thought of as structuring otherwise unstructured phenome-
nal experience, which in itself only provides raw material. For
instance, what pain and colors are, is thought to be due to the con-
ventions of each language.1 Phenomenal experience, in contrast,
is thought to be independent of language. For instance, the sensa-
tions one has when perceiving a color are thought to have a quality
that is merely named in language. Studies such as that on joint
attention would then show that shared intentional engagement
can be had before and without language. But this is by no means
the only interpretation. Such studies may also show that, on the
one hand, language itself is rooted in human behavior, and, on the
other, that pre-linguistic forms of shared intentional engagement
are for normal speakers of a language shaped by that language.
This paper argues that language and phenomenal experience both
come together in shared intentional engagement.
Usually, shared intentionality is discussed under the heading of
“collective intentionality.” Collective intentionality mainly con-
cerns intentions that obviously cannot be had by one individual
alone, such as the task of carrying an object that is too heavy
for one person. A paradigmatic question in the discussions of
1Examples of sensations are very different from the main examples of the
debate around internalism and externalism that emanated from Putnam and
Burge. The latter usually concern scientific concepts and not experiences, and
involve something that is usually thought to be part of the external world, such
as H2O.
collective intentionality is if “we-intentions” can be reduced to
a sum of “I-intentions” (cf. Tuomela and Miller, 1988; Schmitz
et al., 2013). The notion of shared intentional engagement, in
contrast, is meant to draw attention to shared engagement in
actions or entities that are typically done or had by only one indi-
vidual. For instance, when a person talks about some pain she is
feeling, she intends a pain that only she is having. That seems to
speak against the above definition of shared intentional engage-
ment, for apparently the meaning of the pain she refers to is not
shared with others. But is this really so?
Let’s first consider what language has to do with phenomenal
experience. There is a sense in which one can say that only the
person who has the sensation can know that she has an experi-
ence of pain: in theory, she could always pretend she is feeling
pain. But can we deduce from the fact that only she is having that
instance of a pain that the meaning of that pain sensation can
be known only to her? I think that such a conclusion would be
preposterous. Wittgenstein gives strong reasons against it in the
context of his thoughts on the possibility of a “private language”
in Philosophical Investigations. He admits that there is a sense in
which somebody can attend to her experience that she could not
describe to others—or herself (Wittgenstein, 1999, p. 277). But
the impression one has at one moment is different from what is
meant by sensation terms; the meaning of these terms needs to be
recognized in repeated instances, which is done with the help of
rules and criteria. Even if “pain” was only a word for something
like “this feeling,” the deictic reference to “this feeling” would still
be determined with the help of rules and criteria, which are at
least potentially public. If there were no such criteria, the person
having the pain herself would not know whether what she is hav-
ing is a sensation, and less that it is a sensation of pain, rather
than some other sensation. As a quality that can be recognized in
other instances, the pain can be described to others and known to
others.2
Wittgenstein’s investigations into language match up well with
the everyday experience of understanding other people’s feelings.
Of course, talking with somebody about her or his pain does not
give us that person’s pain. Since language and experience are dif-
ferent, there is always something about experience that cannot
be conveyed by language. But speaking about somebody’s pain
can give us a pretty good idea of what the pain is like for the
person. Our everyday experience is that of shared intentional-
ity even when we refer to seemingly merely subjective feelings
like pain. When doing so, we may make use of theory and sim-
ulation: we may theorize about the behavior of others, and we
may try to relate it to sensations we know from our own expe-
rience. But the above consideration of the role of language for
phenomenal experience suggests that phenomenal experience is
not independent of rules and criteria that are expressed in lan-
guage and pre-linguistic behavior. Because the rules and criteria
of a language are shared between the speakers of the language,
they enable shared intentional engagement.
The argument that experience is not independent of rules and
criteria that are embedded in language and behavior is often
2For further considerations ofWittgenstein’s thoughts in this respect see Rudd
(1999) and Durt (2014).
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misunderstood as the claim that language shapes in other ways
unstructured experience. For instance, conventionalists claim that
language carves out certain color experiences that could as well
be carved out differently by different languages. Under this view,
which hue in the (physical or phenomenal) color spectrum is
called “blue” is conventional, and color words could just as well be
assigned to different hues. I think, however, that this is not only a
simplistic view of language, but that it also is inconsistent with the
phenomenology of sensations. I now would like to shortly outline
how phenomenological investigations can show that phenome-
nal experience itself is structured in many ways, and that these
structures are not up to the individual subject.
There are some sensations that seem to force themselves upon
us, or at least “pop out” from the stream of conscious experience.
The experiential quality of a severe pain, for instance, demands
attention, regardless of whether the pain has a serious cause or
not. Other kinds of pain, such as a dull pain, are less promi-
nent and sharply distinguished. In a similar way, a typical red,
blue, or green seems to pop out much more than mixtures of
these colors. In this sense, they have a characteristic phenom-
enal quality. For instance, when looking at a rainbow that has
an equal distribution of wavelengths from infrared to ultraviolet,
one would expect that the color gradient has a smooth appear-
ance. But the phenomenal appearance of a rainbow is different; it
looks as if some colors were more prominent than others, and
as if there were steps in the distribution of colors. This may
be the reason for why sensations are often thought to be self-
intimating, that they reveal themselves to the person who has
the experience just by having that experience. But this thought
relies on the questionable assumption that individual phenom-
enal experiences are unaltered by such things as attention, the
context of conscious experience, and learned distinctions, which
would not only speak against the above considerations of lan-
guage, but also is contradicted by the phenomenal structures
of experience.
For instance, there is a structure to color sensations. One
may imagine a subject that has inverted phenomenal experi-
ences of yellow and blue, but such an inversion would at some
point lead to different behaviors. When asked which experi-
ence looks brighter, the person with the inverted experiences
would either have to answer that the blue looks brighter. Or,
what she or he perceives as bright and dark would have to be
inverted, too. Yet, due to the unequal distribution of hue, sat-
uration, and brightness throughout the color spectrum, such
inversions would become apparent with sufficient further inter-
subjective interaction.3 Studying the actual structure of color
sensations shows that if “inverted qualia” are possible at all, then
only to a very limited degree. Most phenomenal experiences can-
not be completely different from one individual to another, and
the relations between such qualitative experiences are not up to
the individual. Because the structure of phenomenal experience
is not something completely individual, it enables shared inten-
tional engagement. This result of phenomenological study goes
well together with the above remarks on language.
3Cf. e.g., Hilbert and Kalderon, 2000.
Philosophical investigations are often seen as at best relevant
for meta-scientific considerations. But phenomenological discov-
eries such as that of pop out colors go well together with empirical
research. For example, Berlin and Kay, in their famous study on
basic color terms (1969) claim that, rather than picking out arbi-
trary parts of the color spectrum, basic color terms throughout
a wide array of languages are clustered around foci. This sug-
gests that there is something non-conventional about color terms,
a suggestion that may receive further impetus by a study of the
physiology of color perception. After all, the physiology of our
sense organs and our nervous systems is relatively similar, in
spite of important variances, which can sometimes lead to typ-
ical variations and aberrations. One way in which the build of
the perceptual system could influence color vision is that human
cone cells and neural structures react especially well to specific
stimuli, which may cause the perception of focal colors. The phe-
nomenal pop out experiences may, in turn, be the reason for why
there are foci for basic color terms in a number of different lan-
guages. In a similar way, future empirical research into language
and physiology may explain why there are shared structures in
sense perception. An example of an interesting subject of further
study in which phenomenology and empirical research can enrich
each other are synesthetic experiences.
Even researchers who try to model basic color terms on a
“purely cultural route” recognize that it is “driven, on its turn, by a
non language-specific property of human beings,” which they take
to be physiological (Loreto et al., 2012, p. 4). But, even though
Loreto et al. proclaim a “non language-specific property” as the
basis of color perception, they nevertheless model color terms
as otherwise detached rather than part of a shared phenomenal
structure. As with many authors who write on this topic, they
imply the dichotomy I was arguing against above. On the one side,
it is assumed that if language determines the right use of sensation
terms, they are purely conventional. On the other side, it is pre-
supposed that if there is a phenomenal quality to sensations, it is
only contingently connected to language and behavior. If this were
true, investigations of language and phenomenal qualities could
never be brought together in a unified account of intersubjective
interaction.
The idea that sensations are detached from behavior and lan-
guage often goes back to what Fuchs and De Jaegher call the
“‘inner world’ hypothesis.” They claim that it is presupposed by
theory theory and simulation theory, both of which “conceive of
the mental as an inner realm separated from others by an epis-
temic gulf that can only be crossed by inference or projection.
We are hidden from each other in principle; therefore, we must
infer or simulate the other’s inner states in order to understand
him” (Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009, p. 467). But the above con-
siderations of, on the one side, the role of shared language, and,
on the other side, the shared phenomenal structure of experience,
both suggest that we are not hidden from each other. Both show
that already in repeatable phenomenal experience there is shared
intentional engagement. We are thus not limited to theory and
simulation when explaining other minds, although we may make
use of both.
Because shared intentional engagement is fundamental for all
kinds of human interaction, it is in need of interdisciplinary
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investigation, which has been hindered by the notion that the
phenomenal experiences of humans are hidden from each other.
Intentional engagement is conditioned by, amongst other things,
language and its rules and criteria, forms of behavior, member-
ship in cultures and social groups, the structure of phenomenal
experience, the physiology of sense organs and neural struc-
tures, and much more. Scientific investigations into all of these
can contribute to our understanding of how shared intentional
engagement shapes intersubjective interaction. Investigations
into intersubjective interactions thus need to integrate a num-
ber of diverse fields of research, such as psychology, psychiatry,
neuroscience, and philosophy.
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